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Trade Imbalances and
Economic Theory: The Case
for a U.S.-Japan Trade Deficit
HE U.S. GOVERNMENT and members of the
media have exchanged heated rhetoric with
Japan regarding the existence and size of the
trade deficit between the two countries which,
according to the U.S. Department of Commerce,
stood at $42 billion in 1990.1 The rhetoric on
both sides is exemplified by books such as Trad-
ing Places: How We Allow Japan to Take the
Lead in the United States by former U.S. trade
negotiator Clyde Prestowitz, Jr. and Japan is Not
to Blame: It’s America’s Fault by Osamu
Shinomura, a government economist in Japan.
Each of these books blames the other country
for the large bilateral trade imbalance between
the two. This type of rhetoric assumes that the
existence of a bilateral trade deficit is prima
facie evidence that at least one country is an
unfair trader.
In addition, these types of books implicitly
endorse what is called the “mercantilist” view
of trade—that the bigger the trade surplus a
country runs (at the expense of trade deficits
for other countries), the better off that country
is. This view, however, was discredited long ago
because it denies that trade can be mutually
beneficial to both countries. Of course, if trade
were not mutually beneficial, it would not
occur.
Misperceptions about the nature of the trad-
ing relationship and the cause of the trade
imbalance between the United States and Japan
exist on both sides of the Pacific. This article
looks at some of the underlying causes of bilat-
eral trade imbalances. The paper first examines
this issue theoretically, then focuses specifically
on trade between the United States and Japan.
The purpose of this article is to determine
whether the U.S. trade deficit with Japan is a
natural consequence of the composition of trade
between the two countries, the result of “un-
fair” trading practices, or some combination of
the two. The paper concludes with a discussion
of recent trade talks between the United States
and Japan, and some words of caution about in-
terpreting the meaning of the bilateral trade
deficit with Japan.
‘This is seen by the increased call from many in Congress,
such as Sen. Richard Gephardt of Missouri and Rep. Helen
Bentley of Baltimore, for increased protectionist policies.
Similarly, Congress recently passed the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which greatly increased
the power of the U.S. trade representative and Congress
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exporting countries, the oil-importing country
would have to export an equivalent amount of
products (in terms of value) to the oil-exporting
countries. If, however, the oil-exporting coun-
tries prefer products produced by other coun-
tries, the oil-importing country can eliminate
its bilateral trade deficits only by importing less
oil, which could have negative repercussions on
both economies.
The Composition of EJ~S~-Ja pan
A Simple Example
Suppose there are three islands, A, B and C,
each of which produces one product. Island
A produces fuel, which is used to keep the peo-
ple of Island A warm, and as an input in boat
production on Island B. Island B produces boats,
but needs fuel from Island A to do so. These
boats are used for fishing (the residents of Island B eat only fish) or shipping food. Island C produces fruits and vegetables for domestic
consumption, and can also sell them to Island A (whose residents are all vegetarians) if it has boats. The residents of Island C also desire boats
for recreational purposes.
If, for simplicity, the value of goods exported
is the same for each island and equals
$100,then trade can be described by the follow-
ing table:
Table 2 shows bilateral merchandise trade
balances for the United States and Japan vis-a-
vis each other and other groups of countries
for selected years between 1965-1989. While
there has been a substantial increase in the over-
all U.S. trade deficit since 1975 (with some im-
provement in recent years), the United States
generally runs a surplus (or smaller deficit) with
the western European countries (who import a
significant amount of manufactured products)
and a deficit against Japan and the developing
countries. This pattern existed even before 1976,
when the U.S. merchandise trade balance turned
negative. For example) although the United
States had a 52.2 billion trade surplus overall in
1975, its bilateral trade balance with Japan was
a $2.8 billion deficit.
Japan, on the other hand, generally runs a
trade deficit against the oil-exporting countr-ies
and Canada (which exports raw materials and
food to Japan) and a surplus against the United
States; this surplus occurred even in 1980, when
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TRIANGULAR TRADE
in a world in which trade is conducted across
many countries, it is extremely unlikely that trade
would be balanced between all pairs of coun- tries, especially if there are significant differ-
ences in the composition of their imports and
exports. As demonstrated below, it is far more likely that a country will import goods from one country and export goods to another. This pat-
tern is called “triangular” trade.
I
Trade
Japan has few natural resources, and conse-
quently, as table 1 shows, relies heavily on im-
ports of oil and raw materials. To pay for these
imports, Japan primarily exports finished manu-
factured products to industrialized countries,
with the United States receiving the largest pro-
portion of these exports.
The composition of U.S. trade differs consid-
erably from that of Japan because the United
States primarily imports and exports finished
products. In fact, in 1988 (the last year for which
complete data is available), approximately 80
percent of U.S. trade (both imports and exports)
was in manufactured goods. This difference in
the composition of trade (seen in figure 1) for
the two countries is reflected in the bilateral
trade balances between the countries.
Exports (+) Imports (—) Balance I
I Island ABC A B C
A — 100 0 — 0 100 (100—100)~0
B 0 — 100 100 — 0 (100—100)~0 C 100 0 — 0 100 — (100—100)=O
I Although no island in this example runs an overall trade deficit, each island runs bilateral
trade imbalances with the other two. As this
I highly-simplified example suggests, only under improbable circumstances will trade balance
between any pair of countries.
I One implication of this example is that policies which hinder trade in an attempt to reduce bi-
lateral trade imbalances will generally make
I
both countries worse off. For example, a coun-
try with few energy resources will import
significant amounts of oil from oil-exporting
countries. To run balanced trade with the oil-
MARflHIADPtt ledTable 1
Trade by Commodity Ia Percent of totat3
Japan
Food Crude material Ma IdrIery and Otbe
beverages excluding Mhteral transport manufactured
tobacco petroleum fuels equipment g*ods
Date imports Export Imports Exports Imports Exports imports Exports Imports Exports
1964 7 % 48% 390% % 17,7% 04°k 104% 29.3% 154% 623%
1970 136 3.4 354 18 207 02 113 405 190 840
1975 152 14 20* 18 443 04 66 49 137 47
1980 105 I 0 1~ 500 0.4 53 549 162 423
1985 1 07 14 06 438 03 8~7 617 22 64
19$6 16.0 07 146 0 $OS 03 111 638 272 345
1987 152 0 152 07 288 03 118 653 310 330
1988 15$ 06 150 07 06 02 132 694 358 290
United States
Food Crude materials Machinery and Other
b verages, excluding Mineral transport manufatflured
tobacco petroi*tnn fuels equipment cods
Date Imports Exports Imports gxpprts lmpqrts Exports imports Ex~*xts imports Export*
/
964 214% 174°/a 15.9% 130% 107% 3 % 118% 358% 401% 303°*
1970 15 iiG 120 77 37 280 420 401 304
1975 102 1 .8 a loi 272 42 250 431 313 268
1980 8.0 142 44 118 38 37 250 403 298 300
1985 66 107 31 58 155 48 37$ 47.8 367 81
1986 70 98 30 8.8 104 40 418 483 319 291
1987 63 9.3 30 86 111 32 421 468 316 32*
198$ 5 101 31 87 SO 7 437 461 38.4 3 4
SOURCE. 0 CD ~cqn0mio 0utl~ok Hi tOnoal S~ tistios QEOP Ecocomio Surveys Japan (1990)
— S — pppppp — p — ——p p p —19
I Figure 1
United States and Japan’s Trade by Commodity
for 1988













SOURCE: OECD Economic Outlook: Historical Statistics
‘This includes food, beverages, tobacco, crude materials and mineral fuels.
2This includes machinery, transport equipment and other manufactured goods.
Japan’s overall trade balance was in deficit.2 trade patterns alone predetermine a U.S. bilat-
Thus, Japan must run a surplus against other eral deficit with Japan of approximately $11
countries to pay for its trade deficit with (pri- billion annually.~
manly) oil-producing countries even ~fit were to
reduce its trade surplus to zero. As a result) it Recent U.S. bilateral trade deficits with Japan,
appears unlikely that U.S-Japan trade will ever however) have substantially exceeded $11 bil-
balance. According to one study, triangular lion. The U.S. deficit with Japan reached a high
2The Japanese trade deficit during those years was primar-
ily a result of the oil shock of the 1970s, hencethe sub- stantial increase in its trade deficit with oil-producing countries. 3Bergsten and Cline (1985, 1987). When exchange rate
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Table 2
Merchandise Trade Balances: Japan and the United States (in billions of dollars)
_____— Japan’s Trade Balance With —
OH-exporting Non-oil-exporting
developing developing Western2 Overall trade3
Date United States’ countries countries Canada Europe balance
1955 $ 0.16 $ -057 $052 8—0.14 5010 $ 0.40
1970 0.46 -1.86 1.45 —037 -004 0.44
1975 —0.37 --1160 565 —135 126 —212
1980 734 —3964 13.77 —230 7.34 —10.85
1985 4058 --25.97 19 11 —0.24 10.78 4667
1986 52.52 — 13.78 2476 0.63 1732 83.06
1987 5306 —16.74 24.09 —0.45 20.05 80.43
1988 4798 —16.84 26.64 - 1.87 21.24 77.45
1989 45.70 —2216 26.18 -183 17.16 6496
United States’ Trade Balance With
Oil-exporting Non-oil exporting
developing developing Western2 Overall trade8
Date Japan1 countries countries Canada Europe balance
~965 $ —053 5—039 $ 1.89 S 040 S 2.85 S 4.48
1970 —1 60 0.11 2.26 -2.70 2.49 0.54
1975 —278 --950 603 —1.01 756 215
1980 ~12.18 —40.19 1.00 -660 19.04 —3618
1985 —49.75 —9.66 —4327 —22.18 —2599 -148.47
1986 —58.58 -9.36 - 4872 —2333 —3054 —169.78
1987 —5983 —‘364 5803 —1170 -29.05 —17118
1988 —555i —1029 —4950 —1175 —15.47 —14036
1989 —52.53 —1828 —4927 —1128 —2.07 -12952
‘The U S-Japan and Japan-u S trade balances do not sum to zero because importvalues ‘nclude cost. -nsuranc~ and freight
~cif 1. wh:le export values only :ncljde free on boa’d (fob) costs.
includes Australia and New Zealand.
3The frst five columns do not sum to the total trade balance because tho Soviet union ann i~orme’)eastern-bloc countries
are excluded due to the un’eliability of the dala









(2) CA = (S — I) + (T —
where CA is the balance on the current account,
T is tax revenue and S is private domestic sav-
ings.8 Thus, any surplus (deficit) in the current
account must be due to an excess (shortfall) of
net domestic savings, either private, as shown
by (S—I), and/or public savings, as given by
(T—G).
Table 3 presents the current account balance
for the United States and Japan for selected
years between 1965 and 1988, along with esti-
mates of net domestic savings and investment
rates as a percentage of their respective gi-oss
domestic products (GDP).°Any shortfall in net
savings must be made up by importing foreign
savings; this relationship is measured in the cur-
rent account. If a country has a negative cur-
rent account balance, such as the United States,
it is a net debtor (that is, it owes more to the
rest of the world than it is owed).
As is seen in table 3, the savings/investment
differential is almost identical to the balance on
the current account.’°If the savings/investment
(or current account) balance is negative, as it
has been for the United States since 1982, then
that country is a net debtor, which simply means
that it spends more on government expen~
ditunes and private investment than it saves.
This indicates that U.S. citizens have chosen
higher levels of consumption now at the cx-
where C is private domestic consumption, I is
private domestic investment, G is government
spending, X is exports, and Mi simports. This
can be rewritten as:’
II
of $57 billion in 1987, and currently (in 1990) stands at $42 billion.4 To explain deficits of this magnitude, other factors besides triangular trade
patterns must be examined.
II
OTIHIER ECONOMIC F’AOYiHORS
J ‘IFI-IA.T .AFF’E(HIYF TIHI.E rI)iIi.i)I/)
H fIIkLi%i%:CL
I Seveial other factors play a role in deter- mining the magnitude of the trade deficit with Japan. These factors are both macroeconomic
(such as the different savings and investment
I rates) and microeconomic (such as industry structure and barriers to trade).~
I MacrneconoInuI~
A nation’s savings and investment behavior
has a significant effect on its trade balance. The
I balance on goods described in the previous sec- tion is called the merchandise trade balance; it
is the most commonly cited trade balance statis-
I tic. The current account, the most general mea- sure of a country’s trade balance, includes trade
in services and earnings on foreign investment
both in the United States and abroad (see shaded
I insert on next page).8
The macroeconomic determinants of the cur-
I rent account can be generated from national in- come accounting identities. The gross national product (GNP) of a country is defined as the
following:
I
4These numbers are from the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, which uses the same classification for both imports
and exports, and thus is a more consistent series. These
numbers are not used in the table, however, because a
similar measure of the trade balance for Japan is not
available,
5Another important macroeconomic factor is the behavior of
the dollar/yen exchange rate. However, the nature of the
relationship between exchange rates and the trade bal-
ance is the source of a vast literature. The exact link be-
tween these variables remains unresolved. Even studies
that argue that the exchange rate has been a substantial
factor in the trade imbalance between the United States
and Japan remain unable to completely explain the size of
the trade deficit. For simplicity, therefore, the relationship
between the dollar/yen exchange rate and the U.S-Japan
trade balance is ignored here. For discussions of this rela-
tionship, see, for example, Haynes, Hutchison and Mikesell (1986), Bergsten and Cline (1985, 1987) and Sakamoto (1988).
°Whilethe magnitude of the merchandise trade and current
accounts are not identical, they have moved fairly closely
together over time. Although the current account is the
more general measure of trading activity, bilateral current
account figures are not available. For a more detailed
discussion of the balance of payments statistics, see U.S.
Department of Commerce (1990).
‘For a derivation of Equation 2, see Chrystal and Wood
(1988).
°For details and a more complete discussion of national
income accounting in an open economy, see Dornbusch
(1950).
°Thedifference between ONP and GDP is that GDP ex-
cludes net factor payments from abroad while OMP in-
cludes them.
10ln fact, the only difference is due to measurement error,
because the current account is measured in terms of
goods, services and income flows rather than in terms of
savings and investment. The difference is analogous to the
statistical discrepancy between the expenditure and in-
come approaches to calculating GNP.
S
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I
How does this affect U.S. trade with Japan?
I Japan has a positive (and, until recently, an in- creasing) savings/investment balance.12 This
means its citizens have chosen to attain higher
I levels of consumption in the future relative to higher current consumption. As a result, Japan’s
net savings are invested abroad, with much of
I its savings flowing into the United States. In- deed, the United States has been a good place for foreign citizens to invest their savings for
several reasons; until recently, the United States
11There is much debate over whether the size of the U.S.
current account deficit is undesirable. For some arguments
as to why a current account deficit might have a positive effect on an economy, see Chrystal and Wood (1988). 12The “high” rate of savings in Japan is usually attributed
to many different factors, including the price of housing,
the demographics of the population and the tax system.
As a result, the fundamental difference in
their net savings positions is a significant factor
in the size of the U.S-Japan bilateral trade
deficit.
Microeconomic Factors
Microeconomic factors also affect the volume
of imports and exports and therefore the trade
For a discussion of the savings and investment rates and
their implications for Japan’s economy, see Bergsten and
Cline (1985, 1987) and Belassa and Noland (1988). For a
discussion of some problems in measuring the savings















pense of lower consumption later, instead of
saving more now and consuming more later.”
has had relatively higher interest rates than
many industrial countries, and it is a safe haven
for foreign investments since there is essentially
no possibility that the United States government
will default on its bonds.
a
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balance of a country. It is often argued that
Japan has implicit and explicit trade barriers
and that its economy inherently has a more
protectionist structure than economies in other
industrialized countries.
There have been several attempts to measure
empirically how “open” the Japanese economy
is to imports. Such estimates vary widely due to
different assumptions and methodologies. In
general, however, these studies usually find lit-
tle evidence that the composition of Japan’s ex-
ports and imports deviates substantially from
what general economic trade theory would pre-
dict, given Japan’s comparative advantage and
location.” Nevertheless, the perception that
Japan is more protectionist than other industri-
alized countries still remains. As a result, there
have been several bilateral negotiations between
the United States and Japan such as the Market-
Oriented Selected Sector(MOSS)talks in the
mid-1980s directed at increasing trade in spe-
cific sectors.’4 There is some evidence that these
talks have had some success. In the past four
years, U.S. firms have increased their annual
sales in semiconductors by nearly $1 billion
(roughly a 4 percentage point increase).” More
recently, such talks have expanded to include
more general policies that affect trade, as seen
in the recently-concluded Structural Impedi-
ments Initiative (SlI). ‘These talks were an at-
tempt to “identify and solve structural prob~
lems in both countries that stand as impedi-
ments to adjustments in trade and balance of
payments accounts, with the goal of contribu-
ting to a reduction of trade imbalances.”°The
511 is discussed in more detail below.
Explicit ‘Trade Barriers — In terms of its
explicit trade barriers, Japan’s taliffs and subsi-
dies are fairly low. Figure 2 shows the change
in tariffs before and after the Tokyo Round of
negotiations of the General Agreement of Trade
and Tariffs (GATT), the last completed round
of multilateral trade negotiations, which demon-
strates that Japan has reduced these barriers by
more than the European Community. In fact,
Japanese tariff rates on industrial goods are,
on average, lower than U.S. rates. Overall, most
studies agree that Japan’s explicit trade barriers
are not out of line with other industrialized
countries.
There are certain sectors, however, that r’e-
main heavily protected in Japan. The most ex-
treme example is rice, which cannot be import-
ed by Japanese law. Japanese officials argue
that this ban is necessary for national secur-
ity, because of Japan’s dependence on foreign
sources for much of its food stuffs. U.S. indus-
try officials, on the other hand, argue that if
the han were lifted, U.S. rice exports could rise
to as much as $656 million.”
Typically agriculture is heavily subsidized in
industrialized countries; the U.S. rice industry is
no exception. As of 1986, the U.S. rice industry
was the most heavily subsidized U.S. grain.’~As
a result, if current negotiations succeed in open-
ing Japan’s rice market to foleigners, U.S. rice
subsidies will have a distorting effect on trade.
Studies that attempt to measure the effect of
eliminating this trade barrier with Japan must
take into account the price distortions resulting
from subsidies in other countries as well.
implicit Trade Barriers — A more con-
tentious issue between these countries, how-
ever, involves implicit trade barriers, which are
less clearly defined and therefore their effect is
more difficult to measure. Such barriers can
take various forms. Table 4 provides a descrip-
tion of selected trade barriers, most of which
Japan has been accused of employing. The first
section lists explicit trade hairiers, while the
lower half of the table lists implicit barriers. For
example, standards, testing and certification
procedures can he used as trade barriers if the
regulations discriminate against foreign firms.
“See, for example, Saxonhouse and Stern (1989), Bergsten
and Cline (1985, 1987) and Belassa and Noland (1988). For
a critical discussion of these studies, see Cline (1990). For
a dissenting view, see Lawrence (1987).
14These talks focused on four areas: telecommunications,
electronics, forest products and medical equipment and
pharmaceuticals. These sectors (excluding forest products)
are imperfectly competitive, which creates the possibility
that profits are earned above economic costs (including
the cost of capital). Recent trade theory has suggested
that government can, through trade barriers, shift these
profits from foreign to domestic firms. This policy is called
“strategic trade policy,” (although the term strategic refers
to the government actions, not national security). The prac-
tical problems of trying to use this policy, however, appear
to override its theoretical iustification. For further discus-
sion, see Krugman (1987) and Coughlin and Wood (1989).
‘5Schlesinger (1990)
16Assistant trade secretary Charles Daliara in Rowen (1990).
“Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (1990).
iSThis is determined using producer subsidy equivalents.
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Figure 2
Rate of Average Tariffs
Before and After the Tokyo Round
2
SOURCE: OECD Economic Surveys: Japan
One example of this type of discriminatory prac-
tice — taken from a recent book by former U.S.
trade negotiator Clyde Prestowitz, Jr.—occurred
when U.S. firms attempted to sell baseball bats
in Japan.’” After’ a U.S. company finally received
approval to sell aluminum bats in Japan, new
standards for the required safety seal from the
government were introduced that necessitated
F the use of a specific aluminum alloy as well as a
base plug not found in U.S-produced bats.
After the U.S. filed a formal complaint through
procedures established by GATT, the standards
were revised to allow INS, firms access to the
Japanese aluminum baseball bat maiket. New
“See Prestowitz, Jr.(1988).
2cFor further discussion and analysis of implicit trade bar-
riers in Japan, see Christelow (1985-86), Cline (1990) and









restrictions, however, were then passed, requir-
ing inspection of the factory and products to
take place in Japan. Because the bats were pro-
duced in the United States, Japanese officials
individually inspected every lot of bats upon ar-
rival in Japan. This slowed down imports and
increased the cost of importing bats, making
them less competitive. While this issue has since
been resolved and the restrictive requirements
have been eliminated, it provides a good exam-
ple of how implicit trade harriers are used.20
Another example of implicit trade law restric-
tions is seen in the Japanese Large Scale Retail
































Selected Non-Tariff Trade Barriers I
Explicit Trade Barriers
1 Import quotas Restrictions on quantity and/or value of imports of specific com-
modities for a given tIme period: admin:stered globally, selectively
or blaterally
2 Voluntary export Restrictions :mposed oy importing country but administered by
restraints exporting country, administered multilaterally and bilaterally, re-
quires system of lFcensing: essentially s’rnilar to an orderly
marketing arrangement
3 Domestic content and Requires that an industry use a certain proportion of domestically
m~x ng requirements produced components and/or materials n producing final products
4 Annoumpirig duties Imposition of a spec~alimport duty when the price of mports is
alleged to lie below some measure of foreign costs of production.
minimum prices may be established to ‘‘trigger” antidumping in’
vestigations and act.ons
5 Countervailing duties Imposition of a special impon duty to counteract an alleged foretgn
government subsidy to exports. normally reqwreo that comestic n~
jury be shown. I
Implicit Trade Barriers
1 Government Pr&erences given to domestic over foregn •~rms.n bidding on
procurement pol.c es p.Jbl’c.procurentent contracts, rcud ng informal procedures favor
ng procurement from domestic firms
2 Macrceconom’c Monetary/f scat. oalance-o~-paymentsand exchange-rate acticns
pci c’es wh.ch have an impact on national output, foregn trade and capnal
movements
3 ~ornpeutionpol.ue~ Ant;trust and ‘elateo pohces desrgneo to lnster or restrIct competi-
ton arid whici may have ar- •mpact on foreign t’aoe and
‘nvestment
4. Gove’nment r.dus’riai Government acrions oes~gned to ad pa~tcuiarfirms indust’y
poiicy aid regicna sectors. ano regions to adjust to changes in market condit’ons
development measure
5 Government finar-coo Government act ons designed to correct market c’stort.ons and ad
research and private firms, nc’udes technological sprllovers from government
devoiopmer,t and programmes such as oefonse and pubIc nealth.
other technology
pcl’cres
6. Health and sanitary Actions designed fo’ domest c cbjectives bGt wh’ch may
rogu’aiions anc o’scrminate against mpors
qua ny standards
7 Safety and industrial Act ons des~gnedfor domestic oo,ect.ves bu: wnicn ‘lay
stancards and oiscn’ir.ate aga.nst imports
regulaIions















suit of the SlI talks. This law required neighbor- products because the existing distribution sys-
hood approval in Japan for any store larger tem is controlled by companies already in the
than 5400 square feet. Neighborhood shop market. While U.S. policymakers have consid-
owners were able to effectively block large ered this an unfair trade practice, new Japanese
retailers from opening stores that could charge firms trying to enter these same markets en-
low-er prices because of their economies of scale counter the same difficulty. Thus, referring to
(for example, because of the volume of each these regulations as “unfair” trade practices may
product bought by Toys “B” Us, it can charge be incorrect, because the policy treats both
loxver prices than a small neighborhood toy foreign and domestic firms exactly the same. In-
store that purchases only a few of each deed, at the heart of this problem is the debate
product). between the notion of reciprocity, the idea that
,
:
‘This policy blocked foreign firms, such as Toys
“R” Us, from opening stores in Japan. Some
firms in the United States also argued that lim-
iting the size of each shop reduced the likeli-
hood of U.S. products being sold. Many Japan-
ese, on the other hand, argued that these laws
firms must be given the same opportunities in a
foreign country that foreign firms would have
in the domestic market, and the notion of na-
tional treatment, which argues that foreign firms




serve to protect a way of life in Japan. Al-
though changes in the retail store law that
Another example of the problem of distin-
guishing between domestic and trade policies is
weaken the power of neighborhood shop owners the relationship between suppliers and pur-
i
~
may increase U.S. access to these markets, it
may also, in the eyes of some Japanese, have
adverse social consequences by altering the
chasers. Companies in Japan typically have long-
term implicit (and sometimes explicit) contracts
with their suppliers. While it has frequently
structure of neighborhoods.” This conflict he- been alleged that these arrangements are in-
tween domestic and trade policy goals underlies tended to exclude foreign firms, they actually
much of the problems that arise in negotiating serve several useful economic purposes unre-
trade disputes between Japan and the United lated to foreign trade. For example, because
States. Japanese land prices are higher than those in
the United States, it is relatively more costly for
I
IMPLICIT TRADE BARRIERS:
TRADE POLICY OR DOMESTIC
POLICY?
firms to hold inventories in Japan. As a result,
firms arrange for more frequent purchases of
inputs (referred to as “just in time” scheduling)




One difficulty in determining the intent of
economic policies is the problem of separating
domestic and trade-related policies, such as in
the retail law described above. Another example
of this problem can be seen in the different
anti-trust legislation in the United States and
Japan. While it is illegal in the United States
for a company to require a distributor to sell
only the company’s line of products, this prac-
raw materials. Long-term arrangements with
suppliers provide one way to economize on the
costs of frequent recontracting. Other Japanese
policies that are sources of trade disputes be-
tween the United States and Japan include the
procedures for obtaining patents, government-
supported research and development and public
expenditure on infrastructure (such as roads
and sewers).~~
tice is permitted under certain conditions in Criticism of domestic practices affecting the
I
Japan.22 As a result, many U.S. manufacturers
have had difficulty finding distributors for their
flow of trade has also been leveled against the




2See, for example, Sanger (1990).
“2tJnder the Antimonopoly Act, restricting the business tran-
sactions between the firm’s trading partners and competi-
tors is, in general, illegal if such conduct could result in limiting the options of the firm’s competitors. Whether the business opportunities of the competitor have been re-
duced is to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and there
are many exceptions to these regulations.
23This article assumes that national treatment is the appro-
priate policy. For a recent discussion of this issue, see
Bhagwati and Irwin (1987).





The Structural Impediments Initiatw (SI!) deficit re see a proof’ that the
wa an unusual trade agreement for several agreements are not being honored.
reasons In particular the negotiations fo- One problem with SIT i th t much of lii
cused primarily on domestic policrn with iim- ‘agreement” i not binding particular) on
pbcations for di trade deficit between the the United States. Rather, the languag is
United States and Japan As a result, couched interms of conunttments to improv
negotiator were in the unusual position of ing the area and not in terms of formal
demanding change that could benefit the obhgations. Although in ny analysts believe
foreign countr as well as the negotiators’ the e talks will have little if an effect on
own country Fo example the U.S wanted U.S Japan U’ de, there is some prelunmar
the Japanese to ‘reform’ its distributto exid nec that both countrie are a least
ystem. In doing so Japan might not only in attempting to implement some of these
crease U S firm acces to these m kets, changes. The L S Congre has pa sed a new
but also improve their own market budget-reduction plan inoreo er, Japans
efficiency budget calls for an increase ~nspending on
Thesetalk were also unusu 1 in that thex public infrastructure
addre sed broader, more fundamental macro
economic factors rather than focusing on Summaxy o~the SIT agreement
problems in pecific ectors as in previous Among other thing Japan greed to the
talks, One problem with specific ector negot following
iattons is that agreement and heir ubs
quen enforcement do not ne essarily inply a 1. Expanding vestment in cial overhead
reduction ix the bilateral trade defic t A pital (e g • wa er supply sewe s, hous
discu sed by Frankel (1990) thi ‘results log parks) ran po ation nf as ucture
oriented’ approach 1w the unfortunate con- international ports and airports and cargo
equence that failures to reduce the trade and customs pro essing facilities
‘This twist in trade negotiations is discussed in an aptly 3lhese surerna ies are taken from theJoint Report of
titled paper The Structurat Impediments Initiative the U S -Japan Working Group n the Structural Un
Japan Again Agrees to Become Mere Efficient’ by Jet ped nients Initiative (1990)
frey A Frankel (1990)
2For a discussion of attitudes regarding the SIt see
Ii S,lnternationaf Trade Commission (1990).
II
budget defi it has been blamed for much of the Whether that initiative will be successful in
U S trade deficit, because it contributed to the reducing the U.S-Japan trade deficit is unclear.
demand for foreign savings As a result, the size Perhaps the biggest problem is that there are
of the federal deficit has been an i sue in re few obligation for either country to implement
cent negotiations to reduce the U.S. bilateral specific policies. Not surprisingly, as a result of
trade deficit ith Japan. Thus, is ues that once these talks there has been considerable debate
were considered purely domestic now begin to over the usefulness of this type of bilateral trade
enter trade negotiations. I he most recent exam- negotiationY Recent evidence, particularly in
pIe of this phenomenon is the Structural Tm Japan, suggest that these talks have had some
pediments Initiatite (see shaded insert above). effe ‘t. Aside from the changes to the Large-
25For a discussion on how to measure the effectiveness of
these types of policy declarations, see von Furstenberg
and Daniels (1990).
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2. Retiett ing its land policies including taxes binding arid genc’raIlx- enipImsize intention~ i.,e restrictions and zoning latt s to more r ~ither than conimitmr’nI. r\irrcirig other
JuIR utilize public’ larick. things the toiled Stales agreed in the
3. Rex iott rig standa I’d ‘~. c’sling atul c-c-i-lift ‘a.- tillott Lug:
toil requirc-nietils. introducing greater I Rc’al’fir’rning as goak to n-duct’ tie’ size
trart)arenn in the r,suanc-t’ of otircial ad— of tIn’ l~iiclgetdeficit.
ministrative tztridaiici- anti the opeia- -- - -. - - . 2. ,riccitu’,igitig p1.-it ate sat nig,, and reducing nuns ot indu’~tr-vadvisor’x conimitlees and -~ . -. -
— — consumer’ (.e)t by tightening aci’c’ss to got c-in ment s I inlv grot I~5. credit car ds.
4 lmproviri” import 1jr-oc-c’clur’es and relaxing - .- -
~“ -. 3. Redurint4 the cost ol capital tor corpora- lint s UIIII i-ngtihitions that iiii1irde foreign . - - -- norm through ~uc-h niec-hanisms as a lower- cln’ect investment and restrict ellti’\ lit
- -. . capital gun),, ta,~
he-ge retailers, liquor ,,Lcrr’es. ti’uc’k operators and phai’rnac’res. 4. Reducing IS. export contm-oI.~and liiwr’ai- — - ‘‘ i/ill’’ ililport restrictions such as the ohm-
- I’.\ a Ill riing and itt isiil~ as Iiec-essait the C’
- Ian e’tpoi’t i’estrauit agr’eenients (iii steel Japan 1-air I r-ade Lomnussron and other —
‘ . and rnachinpj tool-,, ginerriment policies tona rd prerruLini (It— lw’s adver’tisr’nieriis and vertical tnr~ines~ 5. Increasing funds Foi ic}sear’chi and clevc’l—
twacI ices affec’iirig rorisumer goods (e.g. O~ men t and spendlug on odin‘alion liii par’-
i’esalc’ pr-icc’ nlaintonan 0 ‘ suggc’stecl ticular ice Foreign language. realhennatics pr-it e,’’ exclusive dealersiups or’ ter’rilories. and sc’ic’ric el.
r’c’bjales ~nid retLir’n’.). t;. \laintahrlirlg non-dour innlator’\- tr’eatnteril
‘I he I nih—c] States also made a scrip,- tit of .lapanese liltestnient Iii tile I.nited on c’essions; hon ever. Ihe,r a ~~ect I to 1w less SIatcs.
‘These summaries are taken from the Jo!nt Report of the U 5.-Japan Working Group on me Structural Im- ped~mentsInitiatvefl990).
I
Scale Retail Store Law already discussed, the at a time when there is increasing concern current Japanese budget calls for a 6.2 percent voiced in the media regarding recent Japanese
increase in spending on public works (such as purchases in the United States of such high
roads and housing)?” In fact, some analysts have profile items as Rockefeller Center in New York suggested that these negotiations actually pro- City and Columbia Pictures in Hollywood.28 A
vide a rationale for countries to implement un- new round of talks on structural impediments
popular domestic reform.” For example, al- began January 17, 1991.
though regulations limiting the size of retail A more serious problem with bilateral trade stores are very popular, one effect of this law is agreements is that the issues they attempt to
that consumers pay higher retail prices. For this address are inherently multilateral rather than
reason, there has been pressure (both inside bilateral. In general, a reduction in Japan’s trade and outside Japan) to open these markets; the restrictions affects its trade with not only the
SlI included an agreement to relax these regula- United States but virtually all other countries as
tions. In the United States, the agreement to well. For this reason, there has historically been maintain non-discriminatory treatment of more support, particularly in the United States, Japanese investment in the United States comes for multilateral negotiations.
26Thompson (1990). See also ‘You Won’t Know it in 2000” 28See, for example, Smith (1990). For a discussion of
(1991). foreign investment in the United States and some of the
“See, for example, Frankel (1990). common misperceptions, see Toichin and Tolchin (1988).
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CONCLUSION Coughhn, Cietus C., and Geoffrey E. Wood. ‘~nIntroduction
to Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade,” this Review
Many people assume that the existence of a (Janua~/Februa~ 1989), pp. 32-46. I
bilateral trade deficit is considered prima fade Deardorff, Alan V., and Robert M. Stern. “Methods of
evidence of unfair trade practices by the coun- Measurement of Non-Tariff Barriers,” United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (Geneva: United Na-
try running the trade surplus. However, this ar- tions, 1985), I
tide has shown that many factors determine Dornbusch, Rüdiger. Open Economy Macmeconomics (Basic
the bilateral trade balance between two coun- Books, Inc., 1980).
tries. These factors include the composition of Frankel, Jeffrey A. “The Structural Impediments Initiative:
trade, the net savings position of each country Japan Again Agrees to Become More Efficient,” unpublish-
and the types of anti-trust legislation and en- ed paper, University of California, Berkeiey (July 1990).
forcement policies. Much of these differences Hayashi, Fumio. “Is Japan’s Savings Rate High?,” Federal
are due to different economic characteristics, in Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (Spring
terms of natural resources and industrial struc- 1989), pp. 3-9.
ture, as well as social and cultural differences. Haynes, Stephen E., Michael M. Hutchison and
None of these factors however, suggest that Raymond F Mikesell. “Japanese Financial Policies and the U.S. Trade Deficit,” Essays in International Finance
trade is ever likely to balance bilaterally be- (Princeton University, April 1986).
tween any pair of countries. . “U.S-Japanese Bilaterat Trade and the Yen-
This conclusion certainly applies in the case Dollar Exchange Rate: An Empirical Analysis:’ Southern
Economic Journal (April 1986), pp. 923-32.
of U.S-Japan trade. Much of the U.S-Japanese
bilateral trade deficit can be attributed to dif- Joint Report of the U.S-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative (June 28, 1990).
ferent savings/investment ratios and the dif-
ferences in the composition of trade between Krugman, Paul R. “Is Free Trade Passe?.” Economic Perspectives (FaIl 1987), pp. 131-44.
the two countries. Unless fundamental domestic
economic changes occur in both the United Lawrence, Robert Z. “Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or Minds?,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
States and Japan, it is unlikely that the trade (2:1987), pp. 517-54.
imbalance between the two countries will be
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 7990 National Trade
significantly reduced. As a result, U.S. policies Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (GPO, 1990).
designed simply to reduce the trade imbalance Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
will likely be ineffective or even detrimental to OECD Economic Surveys: Japan (December 1990).
both countries’ economies. Prestowitz, Clyde V., Jr. Trading Places (Basic Books,
Inc., 1988).
Rowen, Hobart. “Trade Talks Bought Only Time:’
Washington Post, April 15, 1990.
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